

**United States Department of the Interior
Office of the Secretary**

**Report to the Director
Office of Law Enforcement and Security**

**Security Assessment of Boston National
Historical Park/USS Constitution
Charlestown Navy Yard
Boston, MA**



Assessment Dates: August 9 – 11, 2011

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

BNHP	Boston National Historical Park
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CSO	Contract Security Officer
CSF	Contract Security Force
DOI	Department of the Interior
EACS	Electronic Access Control System
ECP	Entry Control Point
EOD	Explosive Ordinance Disposal
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
NCI	National Critical Infrastructure
NPS	National Park Service
OEP	Occupant Emergency Plan
OLEs	Office of Law Enforcement and Security
PIN	Personal Identification Number
TOC	Telecommunications Operations Center
UPS	Uninterruptable Power Supply
VBIED	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VCA	Video Content Analysis

Executive Summary

This report documents the findings of a security assessment conducted at the Charlestown Navy Yard, Boston National Historical Park (BNHP) by the Department of the Interior (DOI/Department) Office of Law Enforcement and Security (OLES). The evaluation, conducted in August, 2011, served to assess the Park's compliance with the requirements established in Departmental Manual, Part 444 Chapter 2 (444DM2) entitled, "National Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Security". Generally speaking, 444DM2 sets forth the security requirements the Department deems minimally necessary to safeguard the National Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource assets it owns or controls. These requirements are presented in five general categories; *Security Personnel*, *Perimeter Security*, *Access Control*, *Interior Security*, and *Security Planning*. Working directly with National Park Service (NPS) Law Enforcement Rangers, the OLES assessment focused on assessing the park's level of compliance within each of these five categories.

At its conclusion, the assessment revealed that the NPS, in partnership with the Department of the Navy, has implemented a wide range of security enhancements throughout the Park. These enhancements include, but are not limited to: (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

Background

Established in 1800, the Charlestown Navy Yard in Boston, Massachusetts, served the Department of the Navy with distinction, especially proving its worth in our nation's wars, until its closing in 1974. The men and women of its workforce built more than 200 warships and maintained and repaired thousands.

In 1974, pursuant to enabling legislation (16 United States Code, Section 410z), Boston National Historical Park (BNHP) was created. The park's enabling legislation includes approximately 30 acres of the Charlestown Navy Yard within which resides the USS Constitution (Refer to Photo No. 1), a commissioned US Naval ship which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, United States Navy. The USS Constitution's mission is to promote the US Navy and America's naval heritage through educational outreach, public access, and public demonstrations.


As a result of Secretarial Law Enforcement Directive 14, the OLES was directed to develop a security policy oversight and compliance program. On April 7, 2006 the Department approved 444DM2, National Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CI/KR) Security. This chapter of the Departmental Manual (DM) provides the framework for conducting this and future security assessments at all National Monuments and Icons (NM&I's).

The Department has conducted several security reviews of the BNHP's Charlestown Navy Yard since September 11th, 2001. These included the National Monuments and Icons Assessment Methodology review that was conducted in July, 2003. This review was in response to the Department's role in the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Program under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7. This methodology reviewed the NPS's responsibility for the protection and security of the area surrounding the USS Constitution. The methodology then discussed proposed enhancement strategies and associated costs that could be implemented to mitigate and/or correct the security deficiencies.

A manpower specific review was conducted by OLES in February, 2004 to determine the NPS deployment of manpower in its efforts to achieve an effective level of security for the USS Constitution and to develop possible alternatives.

The second security review was conducted in May, 2006. This review focused on the security deficiencies identified in the 2004 review, which still remained, and updated the costs for staffing, technology, equipment to mitigate and/or correct deficiencies.

Photo No. 1: USS Constitution



Scope and Methodology

Scope Directive 14 of the Secretary’s law enforcement and security reforms¹ adopted the recommendations made by the Interior Office of Inspector General in 2002² and placed responsibility for DOI security policy oversight and compliance with the OLES. By way of implementing this directive, the OLES established a Security Division to provide guidance and oversight of Department security operations, and to monitor and support bureau compliance with Departmental law enforcement and security, policies and procedures.

In an effort to further implement Directive 14, the OLES issued Departmental Manual, Part 444 Chapter 2, entitled, “National Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Security”. 444DM2 establishes the security requirements deemed minimally necessary to safeguard National Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource assets owned and/or controlled by the Department and was developed in coordination with DOI bureaus and offices in response to the “The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets” (February 2003) and Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 “Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection” (December 2003).

Methodology During the period of August 9-11, 2011, personnel from the OLES Security Division conducted a security assessment at the Charlestown Navy Yard, BNHP, to assess the Facility’s compliance with the security requirements established in 444DM2. Generally speaking, these requirements are presented in five categories; *Security Personnel*, *Perimeter Security*, *Access Control Security*, *Interior Security*, and *Security Planning*. The evaluation focused on assessing the Park’s level of compliance within each of these categories.

The evaluation process consisted of informal interviews and group discussions with NPS personnel and U. S. Navy officers assigned to the USS Constitution; the on-site examination of facility infrastructure components, physical security systems, and operational procedures; and a review of relevant documentation to include security force operating procedures, security staffing models, and facility security policies and procedures. Appendix 1 of this report lists evaluation participants.

Findings and Recommendations


In an effort to limit repetition in the narrative, where a specific minimum requirement was found to be applicable to more than one general category (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED], discussion of the requirement has been confined to a single category.

Security Personnel


¹ See *Law Enforcement at the Department of the Interior, Recommendations to the Secretary for Implementing Law Enforcement Reforms*, U.S. Department of the Interior, July 2002.

² See *Disquieting State of Disorder: An Assessment of Department of the Interior law Enforcement*, Inspector General’s Report, (Report No. 2002-I-0014), U.S. Department of the Interior, January 2002.

(b) (7)(E)



(b) (7)(E)



Perimeter Security

(b) (7)(E)





Photo No. 2: Charlestown Navy Yard Map



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(b) (7)(E)

Photo No. 3: Main Vehicle Entrance Wedge Barriers



(b) (7)(E)


Photo No. 4: Vehicle Access Gate to Restricted Area Adjacent USS Constitution



Photo No. 5: Pedestrian entrance adjacent Scale House




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


Access Control Security

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


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


Interior Security

(b) (7)(E)




(b) (7)(E)



Security Planning

(b) (7)(E)



CONCLUSIONS

The security assessment found the NPS continues to have a strong security program at the Charlestown Navy Yard and is generally in compliance with 444DM2. The systems in place to protect the Park and the USS Constitution are effective and it is evident that a significant amount of time and funding have been expended to elevate the level of security. Many of the security enhancements put in place are the result of NPS leadership reviewing the previous security assessment and in cooperation with the U. S. Navy, giving these recommendations funding priority. (b) (7)(E)



The OLES security assessment team commends the professionalism of the law enforcement and security staff. Chief Ranger (b) (7)(C), (b) (6) provided invaluable input into this assessment and displays the behavior of a dedicated law enforcement professional. The physical security program at BNHP is enhanced by assigning a dedicated LE Physical Security Specialist position to the park, which is a best practice for all Icons. In addition, the support and cooperation of the law enforcement and security programs by BNHP senior leadership is apparent and should be commended.

One of the keys to a successful security program is the inclusion of security professionals in planning of projects for possible security enhancements. The planned move of the USS Constitution to dry dock at the Charlestown Navy Yard provides unique challenges, but also opportunities. The planning for this major move of an invaluable National Icon within the Navy Yard can serve as an opportunity for the Navy and NPS to resolve jurisdictional issues and develop a cooperative security plan for the eventual return of the USS Constitution to Pier One.

The Office of Law Enforcement and Security remains committed with the NPS to ensure that the appropriate level of security is in place at BNHP and the USS Constitution. In closing, the OLES review team would like to acknowledge the NPS management and the Law Enforcement and Security staff for their assistance in conducting this assessment.

Security Assessment: Principal Participants

Department of the Interior - Office of Law Enforcement and Security

- (b) (7)(C), (b) (6) - Supervisory Special Agent
- (b) (7)(C), (b) (6) - HSPD7/NIPP Coordinator

National Park Service

- (b) (7)(C), (b) (6) - Deputy Superintendent
- (b) (7)(C), (b) (6) - Chief Ranger
- (b) (7)(C), (b) (6) Safety & Security Specialist