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Appendix N: DOI Action Items from the Implementation PlanThe following action items are taken from the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. Bureaus and Offices indicated on specific action items should ensure their plan addresses these items. 4.2.6.1. DHS, USDA, DOI, and USAID, in collaboration with priority countries, NGOs, WHO, FAO, OIE, and the private sector should support priority country animal health activities, including development of regulations and enforcement capacities that conform to OIE standards for transboundary movement of animals, development of effective biosecurity measures for commercial and domestic animal operations and markets, and identification and confirmation of infected animals.
5.2.1.1. HHS and USDA, in coordination with DHS, DOT, DOS, DOD, DOI, and State, local, and international stakeholders, should review existing transportation and border notification protocols to ensure timely information sharing in cases of quarantinable disease.
5.2.5.2. USDA, in coordination with DHS, DOI, and HHS, should review the process for withdrawing permits for importation of live avian species or products and identify ways to increase timeliness, improve detection of high-risk importers, and increase outreach to importers and their distributors.
5.2.5.3. USDA, in coordination with DOI, DHS, should enhance protocols at air, land, and sea ports of entry to identify and contain animals, animal products, and/or cargo that may harbor viruses with pandemic potential and review procedures to quickly impose restrictions.
5.2.5.5. USDA, in coordination with DHS, DOJ, and DOI, should enhance risk management and anti-smuggling activities to prevent the unlawful entry of prohibited animals, animal products, wildlife, and agricultural commodities that may harbor influenza viruses with pandemic potential, and expand efforts to investigate illegal commodities, block illegal importers, and increase scrutiny of shipments from known offenders.
5.2.5.6. USDA, DHS, and DOI, in coordination with DOS, HHS, and DOC, should conduct outreach and expand education campaigns for the public, agricultural stakeholders, wildlife trade community, and cargo and animal importers/exporters on import and export regulations and influenza disease risks.
5.3.1.4. DHS, in coordination with DOS, USDA and DOI, should provide countries with guidance to increase scrutiny of cargo and other imported items through existing programs, such as the Container Security Initiative, and impose country-based restrictions or item-specific embargoes.
5.3.2.3. DHS, in coordination with USDA, DOS, DOC, DOI, and shippers, should rapidly implement and enforce cargo restrictions for export or import of potentially contaminated cargo, including embargo of live birds, and notify international partners/shippers.
5.3.3.1. HHS and USDA, in coordination with DHS, DOT, DOS, and DOI, should provide emergency notifications of probable or confirmed cases and/or outbreaks to key international, Federal, State, local, and Tribal transportation and border stakeholders through existing networks.
5.3.4.4. DHS and DOT, in coordination with USDA, DOI, DOC, and DOS, should consult with the domestic and international travel industry (e.g., carriers, hospitality industry, and travel agents) and freight transportation partners to discuss travel and border options under consideration and assess potential economic and international ramifications prior to implementation.
5.3.6.2. DHS and DOT, in coordination with DOS, DOD, HHS, USDA, DOI, and State, local, and Tribal governments, should provide the public and business community with relevant travel information, including shipping advisories, restrictions, and potential closing of domestic and international transportation hubs.
6.1.14.1. HHS, in coordination with DHS and Sector-Specific Agencies, DOS, DOD, DOJ, DOL, VA, Treasury, and State/local governments, should develop objectives for the use of, and strategy for allocating, vaccine and anti-viral drug stockpiles during pre-pandemic and pandemic periods under varying conditions of countermeasure supply and pandemic severity.
6.1.14.2. HHS, in coordination with DHS and Sector-Specific Agencies, DOS, DOD, DOL, VA, Treasury, and State/local governments, should identify lists of personnel and high-risk groups who should be considered for priority access to medical countermeasures, under various pandemic scenarios, according to strategy developed in compliance with 6.1.14.1.
6.1.14.3. HHS, in coordination with DHS and Sector-Specific Agencies, DOS, DOD, DOL, and VA, should establish a strategy for shifting priorities based on at-risk populations, supplies and efficacy of countermeasures against the circulating pandemic strain, and characteristics of the virus.
6.1.14.4. HHS, in coordination with DHS and Sector-Specific Agencies, DOS, DOD, DOL, VA, and Treasury, should present recommendations on target groups for vaccine and anti-viral drugs when sustained and efficient human-to-human transmission of a potential pandemic influenza strain is documented anywhere in the world. These recommendations will reflect data from the pandemic and available supplies of medical countermeasures.
6.2.4.2. DHS, in coordination with Sector-Specific Agencies, HHS, DOD, DOJ, and VA and in collaboration with the private sector, should be prepared to track integrity of critical infrastructure function, including the health care sector, to determine whether ongoing strategies of ensuring workplace safety and continuity of operations need to be altered as a pandemic evolves.
6.3.2.7. HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOC, DOL, and Sector-Specific Agencies, and in collaboration with medical professional and specialty societies, should develop and disseminate infection control guidance for the Private Sector.
7.1.1.1. USDA, in coordination with DHS, HHS, DOD, and DOI, and in partnership with State and Tribal entities, animal industry groups, and (as appropriate) the animal health authorities of Canada and Mexico, should establish and exercise animal influenza response plans.
7.1.2.2. USDA, in coordination with DOD, HHS, DHS, and DOI, should partner with States and Tribal entities to ensure sufficient veterinary diagnostic laboratory surge capacity for response to an outbreak of avian or other influenza virus with human pandemic potential.
7.1.3.4. USDA, in coordination with DOI, should collaborate with DHS and other Federal partners, with State, local, and Tribal partners, including State wildlife authorities, and with industry groups and other stakeholders, to develop guidelines to reduce the risk of transmission between domestic animals and wildlife during an animal influenza outbreak.
7.1.3.5. DOI, in coordination with USDA, should work with other Federal, State, and Tribal partners to develop appropriate response strategies for use in the event of an outbreak in wild birds.
7.1.5.1. USDA and DOI should perform research to understand better how avian influenza viruses circulate and are transmitted in nature, in order to improve information on biosecurity distributed to local animal owners, producers, processors, markets, auctions, wholesalers, distributors, retailers, and dealers, as well as wildlife management agencies, rehabilitators, and zoos.
7.1.5.2. USDA and DOI should perform research to develop and validate tools that will facilitate environmental surveillance for avian influenza viruses, especially in wild birds, through the evaluation of feathers, feces, water, or nesting material.
7.1.5.6. USDA, in coordination with DHS, DOI, and DOD, should partner with State and Tribal authorities to refine disease mitigation strategies for avian influenza in poultry or other animals through outbreak simulation modeling.
7.2.1.1. DOI and USDA should collaborate with State wildlife agencies, universities, and others to increase surveillance of wild birds, particularly migratory water birds and shore birds, in Alaska and other appropriate locations elsewhere in the United States and its territories, to detect influenza viruses with pandemic potential, including HPAI H5N1, and establish baseline data for wild birds.
7.2.1.2. USDA and DOI should collaborate to develop and distribute information to State and Tribal entities on the detection, identification, and reporting of influenza viruses in wild bird populations.
7.2.2.3. DOI and USDA should increase the wild bird testing capacity of the NWHC and the National Wildlife Research Center, respectively, to process avian influenza samples from wild birds.
7.2.3.2. DOI, in coordination with USDA, should work with State and Tribal entities, universities, and others to implement the Avian Influenza Data Clearinghouse developed by the NWHC to support the integrated surveillance program for influenza in wild birds.
7.3.1.1. USDA, in coordination with DHS, HHS, DOI, and the Environmental Protection Agency, should partner with State and Tribal entities, animal industries, individual animal owners, and other affected stakeholders to eradicate any influenza outbreak in commercial or other domestic birds or domestic animals caused by a virus that has the potential to become a human pandemic strain, and to safely dispose of animal carcasses.
7.3.1.4. DOI should coordinate with Federal, State, local, and Tribal officials to identify and apply appropriate measures to limit the spread of influenza virus should an outbreak occur in free-ranging wildlife populations.
7.3.5.1. USDA, in coordination with DHS, DOI, and HHS, should work with State, local, and Tribal partners, industry groups, and other stakeholders to develop, clear and coordinated pre-scripted public messages that can later be tailored to the specifics of a given outbreak and delivered by trained spokespersons.
7.3.5.3. USDA, in coordination with DOI, should collaborate in working with Federal partners, with State, local, and Tribal partners, including State wildlife authorities, and with industry groups and other stakeholders, to update and distribute guidelines to reduce the risk of transmission between domestic animals and wildlife and reduce the risk of spread to other wildlife species during an animal influenza outbreak.
9.1.2.1. DHS, in coordination with Sector-Specific Agencies, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and States, localities and Tribal entities, should develop sector-specific planning guidelines focused on sector-specific requirements and cross-sector dependencies.
9.1.3.1. DHS, in coordination with all the Sector-Specific Agencies, should conduct forums, conferences, and exercises with key critical infrastructure private sector entities and international partners to identify essential functions and critical planning, response and mitigation needs within and across sectors, and validate planning guidelines.
9.1.3.2. DHS, in coordination with all the Sector-Specific Agencies, should develop and coordinate guidance regarding business continuity planning and preparedness with the owners/operators of critical infrastructure and develop a Critical Infrastructure Influenza Pandemic Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide tailored to national goals and capabilities and to the specific needs identified by the private sector.
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